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A  free  market  economy  was  once  believed  to  be  capable  of
functioning  without  interference  by  government;  however,  it  does
not automatically  establish optimum demand for goods and services.
During  the  1920's  the  quantity  theory  of  money  became  widely
accepted,  and  the  Federal  Reserve  was  believed  to  be  capable  of
preventing  future  "booms"  and  "busts."  The  great  depression  shat-
tered  those  hopes,  resulting  in increased  emphasis  on  fiscal  policy.
In  1946  Congress  passed  the  Full  Employment  Act,  which  in
effect  made the  government responsible  for maintaining  high levels
of  employment  without  inflation.  The  essential  idea  is  that  the
go vernment,  through  monetary-fiscal  policies,  should  augment  or
offset private  demand  in  such  a  wav  as  to maintain  high  levels  of
employment and stable  prices.  Recently  emphasis  has been given to
two  additional  objectives,  promoting  economic  growth  and  pro-
tecting the  balance  of pavments.
Presently economists generally  agree that monetary-fiscal  policies
should  and  can be  used  to  prevent  extreme  economic  fluctuations.
Almost all economists  agree that monetary policy should be "tighter"
in  a  period  of full  employment  and  inflation  than during  a  period
of  under-utilization  of  economic  resources.  They  also  agree  that
government  revenues  relative  to  receipts  should  be  higher  during
inflation  periods  and lower during recessions.
Unfortunately  this  still  leaves  much  room  for  disagreement  on
which  of these  tools represents  the  more potent force,  on how  tight
or  how  easy  money  should  be  in  particular  circumstances,  and  on
the most desirable  size of the budget  deficit or surplus. Also,  opinion
differs  considerably  about  length  of  lags,  for  both  monetary  and
fiscal policy,  between:  (1) recognition  of a  need for action,  (2) taking
of action, and (3) eventual  impact upon the economy.
These  issues cannot be settled  by  logical  analysis  alone.  Empiri-
cal evidence  must be  brought to  bear  upon  these  areas  of  conflict.
In  this  discussion  I  will present the  basic theory  underlying  the
fiscal policy approach  and  the monetary  policy  approach,  cite  what
I consider to be the relevant evidence and then apply my conclusions
to the current  debate concerning the desirability of a tax cut  as well
14as  the  dispute  concerning  use  of  monetary  policy  for  reducing  a
balance-of-payments  deficit.
THE  CONFLICT  OF  THEORIES
Those emphasizing fiscal policy as a tool for affecting  total de-
mand usually  use the  Keynesian framework  in analyzing the  effects.
Keynes'  theory  placed  primary  emphasis  upon  private  and  public
investment.  Keynes  argues  that:  (1) people's  aggregate  income  will
be increased  by some  multiple  of increased  investment  and (2)  this
multiple,  or  multiplier,  is  determined by the  amount saved  and  in-
vested from each  $100  of increased  income.  For example,  a 1 billion
dollar  increase  in investment  spending  might  result in  a  2.5  billion
dollar  increase  in  income  if  the  multiplier  is  2.5.  The  multiplier
would  be  2.5  if  people  saved  and  invested  $40  of  each  $100  of
increased  income,  spending  the  other  $60  for  consumption  ($100
is  two  and  a  half  times  $40).  Also,  a  sharp  reduction  in  taxes
amounting  to  10 billion  dollars  would  raise  total incomes  25 billion
dollars.  In  other  words,  an  increase  in  disposable  income  would
result  from a tax  cut, and  this  in  turn would lead  to  a  rise  in  con-
sumer spending by  some multiple  of the  decrease  in taxes,  depend-
ing on the size of the multiplier.
The  probable  reason  for  emphasis  on fiscal policy  by  Keynesian
economists  is  Keynes'  argument  that  under  certain  circumstances
monetary  policy  would  be completely  ineffective.  Keynesians  tend
to hold that whether a deficit  is brought  about by a reduction  in tax
receipts  or by  an increase  in  government spending  is  of  little  signi-
ficance.
The  Keynesian  contends  that  the  influence  of  money,  if  any,
would  be  via  its  influence  on  interest  rates  and,  hence,  its  effect
upon  investment  expenditures.  Changes  in  the  quantity  of  money
are not assumed to influence consumer  expenditures  directly.
Those placing primary emphasis upon monetary  policy usually
base  their  arguments  on  the  quantity  theory  of  money.  Quantity
theorists  argue  that changes  in  total spending,  including both  con-
sumption  and  investment,  are  highly  correlated  with  monetary
change.  They hold that  an increase  in the money supply  leads to  an
increase  in  liquid  assets  and  that  holders  of  liquid  assets  will  at-
tempt  to  reduce  excess  liquidity  by  increasing  spending;  hence,
spending  flows will  rise.  Quantity  theorists  typically  argue that  the
method  of  financing  a  deficit  is  of  critical  importance.  Unless  the
money  supply  rises,  the  quantity  theorist  would  contend  that  a
deficit,  regardless  of  how  it  is  brought  about,  would  not  exert  a
strong stimulus upon total spending.
15Both  of  these  approaches  to  analyzing  the  factors  influencing
final demand  is internally consistent.
WHAT  THE  EVIDENCE  SHOWS
The  essential question  is  which  theory  is  most  nearly consistent
with the  facts and can,  therefore, yield the better prediction.  These
two  approaches  have  been  tested  far  too  little,  but  I  would  like
to  relay  the  results  of  some  recent  studies  which  bear  upon  this
issue.
Evidence  on  Monetary  Policy
A recent study by Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago,
and  David  Meiselman,  formerly  of  the  University  of  Chicago,  at-
tempts  to  test the  Keynesian  theory  and  quantity  theory  over  the
period  1897  to  1958  [1].  The  evidence  was  remarkably  consistent
and  clear  cut,  and  although  several  competent  economists  have
tried to question  the results,  they  have not  done  so  successfully,  to
my knowledge.
Throughout  the  period  1897-1958,  the  quantity  of  money  was
much more  closely  associated  with final  demand  than were  invest-
ment  expenditures.  In  fact,  the  correlation  between  money  and
consumption  expenditures  was  .985,  and  the  correlation  between
changes  in  money  and  changes  in  consumption  was  .695.  For  the
same  period  the  correlation  between  investment  expenditures  and
consumption  was  substantially  lower,  .756, and  the  correlation  be-
tween  changes  in  investment  expenditures  and  consumption  was
.095.
Furthermore,  when  money  effects  were  held  constant,  the  cor-
relation between  investment and consumption  disappeared and was
frequently  negative,  whereas  when  the  effects  of  investment  ex-
penditures  were  held constant,  the correlation  between  money  and
consumption  remained  about  the  same  as  previously.
If these findings  can be accepted,  control  of  the stock  of money
is  far  more  useful  than control  over  investment  expenditures  as  a
tool for affecting total spending and, hence,  the  level of income  and
employment.  This  is  indeed fortunate  because  control  of  monetary
change  through  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  is  far easier  than either
control  of government  spending  and revenue  or private  investment
through the action of Congress  and the Chief Executive.
In  another  recently  published  study,  Friedman  and  Anna
Schwartz  (of the National Bureau  of Economic  Research)  concluded
that changes  in the stock  of money  are closely  correlated  with  sub-
16sequent  economic  expansions  and  contractions  [2].  Recessions  in
the  last century have been preceded by monetary contractions,  and
recoveries  have  been  preceded  by monetary  expansion.  They  also
presented strong evidence that the causal influence runs from money
to  economic  activity,  not  from  economic  activity  to  money.  Their
principal  conclusion  was,  "Appreciable  changes  in  the  rate  of
growth of the  stock of money  are necessary and  sufficient condition
for  appreciable  changes  in the rate of  growth of money  income."
Monetary  trends  in seven other leading  free market countries  of
the world  are also  closely related  to the  changes  in  total  gross  na-
tional product,  i.e.,  total  spending  on  finally  produced  goods  and
services  [3].  Countries which had the higher growth in money  also
had the higher growth in GNP since  1956. Since  real resources  were
generally  available in the countries  studied, increased  spending  was
achieved  without sharp inflation except  in France and  Italy.
Rapid  monetary  growth  is  frequently  assumed  to  lead  to  low
interest  rates.  Yet,  if monetary  growth does  stimulate  spending  and
total economic  activity, the consequent higher rate of spending  will
conceivably  generate  a  strong  demand  for  money  and,  therefore,
result  in higher  interest  rates.  In  fact,  the countries  studied  which
have  had  the  highest  monetary  growth  rate  in  recent  years  also
had  higher,  not  lower, interest  rates.  Thus,  interest  rates  appear  to
be primarily  a result of economic  activity rather than  a cause.
Evidence  on Fiscal Policy
Evidence  to support  the  argument  that government  deficits  are
stimulating and surpluses are restraining,  irrespective  of the method
of financing,  is hard to find.  Yet, the argument  tends to be accepted
as gospel.
Adverse  budget  swings  during  economic  expansions  are  fre-
quently  assumed  to  have  thwarted full  economic  recovery,  that  is,
fiscal policy  is  assumed to have  acted  as a depresser  or  restrainer  of
total  spending.  Yet,  although  our  tax  system  has  been  essentially
unchanged  during  the past three  recoveries,  the first recovery  was
excellent and the second which  ended in May  1960 was inadequate.
The  present  recovery  has  not yet  achieved  full  employment  even
though it is now in the thirty-first month of expansion.  Furthermore,
the budget swing  as  a  percent  of  GNP  growth was  largest  during
the most  satisfactory  recovery  and  smallest  during  the present  ex-
pansion.
Correlation between  the budget position  and the accompanying
GNP changes for the postwar period amounts  to  + 0.39 according to
17a  recent  study  by  George  Terborgh  of  the  Machinery  and  Allied
Products  Institute  [4].  These data are contrary to the general argu-
ment that deficits  encourage  expansion  and surpluses exert restraint
since  deficits  are  associated  with  weak  GNP  performance  and  sur-
pluses with strong trends in GNP. When  the budget position  is  cor-
related  with income  trends  six  months  later,  the correlation  shows
no  statistical  significance.
On the international  front  Michael  Levy of  the National  Indus-
trial  Conference  Board  investigated  budget-economic  growth  data
for  six European  countries,  Canada,  and the  United  States  for  the
years 1950-1960.  He concluded that the correlation
. does  not  indicate  any  statistical  relationship  between  budget
deficits  and growth.  Rapid  economic  growth  well  in  excess  of that  of
the  U.  S.  was  associated  with  significant  surpluses  in  the  case  of
Austria,  the  Netherlands,  and  Portugal  and  with  substantial  accu-
mulated  deficits  in the  case  of  France.  Similarly,  much  lower  rates  of
economic  growth  coincide  with  cumulative  budget  deficits  for  the
United  Kingdom  and  the United  States  ....  Limited  and  admittedly
crude  empirical  evidence  presented  does  not  support  current  pro-
nouncements  and  prescriptions  that  larger  deficits,  as  such,  will  al-
most  automatically  result  in  accelerated  economic  growth  over  the
years  [5].
Conclusions  on Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy
The  data  that  I  have  presented  support  the  conclusion  that
monetary  changes,  and  not  budget  changes,  are  the  prime  deter-
mining factor  influencing  subsequent  spending  changes.  This  view
should  not  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  the  only  factor  limiting
economic  growth  is  insufficient  money.  Increases  in  the  stock  of
money  can  increase  total  spending  and,  hence,  GNP,  but whether
the GNP will represent  inflation  or increases  in real production  will
depend  upon  supply  factors.  Potential  for  economic  growth  is
determined  by changes  in real  supply  factors  such  as  the size  and
quality  of  the  labor  force,  average  hours  of  work,  the  stock  of
capital,  the  state  of  technology,  and  the  efficiency  with  which
resources are combined.  On the other hand, the degree of utilization
of these  resources  is determined  principally by  the volume  of total
demand which  can  be influenced  by monetary  change.  Since  1957,
persistent  economic  slack  suggests  that  demand has  not  been  ade-
quate  to  utilize  all  our  resources.
APPLICATION  TO  THE  CURRENT  SITUATION
The  two  major  areas  of  current  economic  policy  debate  are:
(1) the appropriateness  of the  proposed  tax  cut  and  (2) the  role  of
monetary  policy  in  stemming  the  balance-of-payments  deficit.
18A  tax cut  cannot be  counted on to stimulate  total spending  and,
hence, strengthen  final demand unless it is accompanied by adequate
monetary  expansion.  Therefore,  monetary  and fiscal  policies  should
be  used  to  complement  each  other.  Data  cited  suggest  that  ade-
quate monetary expansion would result in strong final demand even
without  a  tax  cut.  Nevertheless,  a  tax  cut  is  desirable  for  several
reasons regardless  of its  effects on  final demand.
First,  our  tax  system  is  in  serious  need  of  revision  for  the  pur-
pose  of  increasing  incentives  and  thereby  increasing  the  capacity
of  our  economy  to  grow.  Many  tax  laws  were  adopted  during
periods  of  war when  little  attention  was  given  to  the  effect  upon
incentives.  A  substantial  reduction  in high  marginal  personal  rates
accompanied  by  a  significant  reduction  in  the  corporate  tax  rate
would  substantially  strengthen  existing  incentives  to  work,  save,
and invest.
Second,  on  philosophical  grounds  I  prefer  limited federal  gov-
ernment  to expanding  federal  activities.  With  a highly  progressive
tax  system, the federal government's  tax receipts  rise more than pro-
portionately  when  the  economy  expands.  Political  pressures  almost
guarantee  that  increased  revenues  will  be  spent  rather  than  used
for  reduction  of  the federal  debt.  Only  an  occasional  reduction  in
tax  rates  can  provide  a  good  chance  of  limiting  growth  in federal
activity.  Some  argue  this  view  is  not  realistic  since  it will  merely
result in  a  continuous  federal  deficit.  The  postwar  experience  does
not support that assertion.  You may  be  surprised  to note  that from
mid-1946  to  mid-1961  we  had  a cumulative  cash  surplus  of 4.2  bil-
lion  dollars  in  the  federal  budget.  Through  fiscal  1963  we  had  a
cumulative  cash  deficit  of  5.7  billion  dollars,  that  is,  a  total  cash
deficit  of  9.9  billion  dollars  in  the  last  two  fiscal  years.  Congress
has  not  done  such  a  bad  job  of  balancing  the  budget  on  average
during the postwar period. Deficits  in recent  years have been sizable,
however,  due  largely  to  the fact  that the  economy  has  performed
somewhat less than satisfactorily.
Finally,  a tax cut would facilitate  the current  objective  of main-
taining  high  short-term  interest  rates  for balance-of-payments  pur-
poses  while  continuing  to  promote  adequate  monetary  growth.
Although  monetary  policy  can  exert  sizable  effects  upon  do-
mestic spending  trends,  it  is  not well  adapted  to stemming  the def-
icit  in  our  balance  of  payments.  Some  have  argued  that  under
present  circumstances  a  much  tighter  monetary  policy  should  be
adopted  for  the  purpose  of  substantially  increasing  short-term  in-
terest  rates.  Although  a  sizable  rise  in  short-term  interest  rates
would  undoubtedly  have  a  favorable  impact  on  short-term  capital
19flows, it could be achieved  via monetary policy only through mone-
tary contraction,  which  would inevitably reduce  domestic  spending
and  force  the  economy  into  a  recession.  Furthermore,  short-term
interest  rates  would  drop  sharply,  adversely  affecting  the  balance
of payments.
The  policy  actually  pursued  in  recent  months  has  been  much
more moderate.  The Federal  Reserve  and Treasury  have attempted
to twist the yield curve by raising short-term  rates while preventing
a rise in long-term rates. The moderate narrowing  in yields resulting
from these  actions  has  so far been  achieved  without monetary  con-
traction.  The  modest  increases  in  short-term  interest  rates  is  of
dubious  benefit to the balance  of payments  particularly  since many
foreign short-term rates also adjusted upward.
A  serious  question  is  whether  concern  about  the  deficit  in  our
balance  of  payments  will  inhibit  monetary  policy  from  exerting  a
strong  stimulus  during  any  future  recession.  Hopefully,  we  will
not repeat  the bitter  experiment  of  1931  when  concern  about  gold
outflows  led to  an aggressively  tight monetary  policy which,  in my
opinion,  substantially  deepened  and  prolonged  the  great  depres-
sion.  This  is not the place  to discuss  the serious  question  of how we
solve  our  balance-of-payments  problem,  but  suffice  is  to  say  that
monetary policy is not an appropriate  tool.
SUMMARY
We  may  conclude  that  the primary  role  of monetary-fiscal  pol-
icies  is  to  influence  final  demand  for  goods  and  services.  Unfortu-
nately  the  free  enterprise  system  has  nothing  in  it  which  will
properly regulate total spending automatically.  Therefore,  conscious
governmental  actions are required.  Although monetary-fiscal policies
can  prevent  severe  swings  in  economic  activity,  little  evidence  is
available  to  indicate  that  our  knowledge  is  sufficient  to  permit
perfection.  Inadequate  knowledge  concerning  the  variability  and
length  of  lags  will  continue  to  encourage  actions  which  in  hind-
sight  prove  to have  been wrong.  The  evidence  would  suggest  that
without  a proper monetary  policy,  fiscal policies  exert only  limited
effects  upon  final demand.  Furthermore,  little  evidence  is  available
to show that monetary policy  is well adapted to alleviating  balance-
of-payments  difficuties.  Although  our  knowledge  concerning  the
impact  of monetary-fiscal  policies  continues  to grow,  further  refine-
ment based upon  careful economic  research  is  urgently needed.
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